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Abstract
Inspired by the recent developments in the field of Spec-
trum Auctions, we have tried to provide a comprehensive
framework for the complete procedure of Spectrum
Licensing. We have identified the various issues the
Governments need to decide upon while designing the
licensing procedure and what are the various options
available in each issue. We also provide an in depth study
of how each of this options impact the overall procedure
along with theoretical and practical results from the past.
Lastly we argue as to how we can combine the positives
two most widely used Spectrum Auctions mechanisms
into the Hybrid Multiple Round Auction mechanism being
proposed by us.
General Terms
Economics, Theory, Spectrum auctions
Keywords
Query Incentive Networks, answer quality
1 Introduction
The world is shrinking. Everyday there is advancement
in the field of telecommunications. Telecommunication,
which was earlier solely dependent on long cables and then
on optical fibres, is now shifting rapidly towards the new
wireless technologies, thanks to GSM and its subsequent
versions. These technologies are dependent on transmis-
sion of airwaves through the atmosphere, the transmission
taking place at a certain frequency. The word spectrum de-
fines a range of frequency. The range of frequency can be
arbitrarily large, but only a small fraction of it can be used
for the telecommunication purposes. The spectrum over a
country’s area is a property of the people of that country
and hence the government of that country. But over past
few years, many private parties have entered in the field of
telecommunications. And as expected they require a slice
of spectrum for that purpose. This also provides a wonder-
ful opportunity for the government as there is useable spec-
trum which is left unused with the government, with only
a fraction of it being used for military and civil purposes
by the governments. The amount of this spectrum is usu-
ally scarce hence the greater demand-supply gap. Along
with generating revenues, privatization of spectrum will
also lead to a faster pace of development by the private par-
ties which may not be always possible to do by the govern-
ment. This has lead to the sale/licensing of the spectrums
by various countries across the globe, using methods like
lotteries, auctions, tenders etc.
1.1 Motivation
Over the past few years, the amount of revenue generated
from the spectrum licensing procedure in various countries
has far exceeded the government and industrial expecta-
tions. With the advent of new technologies, and thus new
uses of spectrum, one can expect further rise in the revenue
for the future spectrum licences. However when there is
big money involved, there is every possibility of attempt by
interested parties to rig the procedure, causing a loss in rev-
enue for the state. Apart from the revenue, the government
must also ensure the implementation of the social issues
involved in the procedure. All these issues, combined with
the several market factors, results in a very complex prob-
lem of designing the licensing procedure. The market fac-
tors we are talking about are the various social, economic,
political and geographical features and issues of a coun-
try. These factors vary from one country to another and
hence it is very difficult to come up with a unified design
theory which will work best for all scenarios. Nonetheless,
we can always provide a basic framework of the complete
auctioning procedure which should be followed by every
government going for licensing the spectrum.
In our attempt, we have tried to come up with a compre-
hensive framework which should act as a guideline for the
governments in the spectrum licensing procedure. This has
been done on the basis of all the research done in this area
in the past couple of decades. Since in economics, often
the practical results differ from the theory, we have also
taken into the account the results of spectrum auctions in
various countries in the same period. Essentially, we have
separately studied the designing and assigning part of the
licensing procedure. As evident from recent results, both
are important to the success of a spectrum licensing proce-
dure.
On the other hand, the auction of choice of late by the gov-
ernments across the globe for spectrum licensing has been
simultaneous ascending auctions. While this procedure has
many advantages over other auction types, a severe draw-
back is that of possibility of collusive bidding by the bid-
ders. We have designed a new hybrid auction, which takes
in the plus points of simultaneous and sequential ascend-
ing auctions and at the same time removes drawback of
both. We believe that the Hybrid algorithm proposed by us
is more robust than any of the existing action mechanism,
without compromising on the complexity of the procedure.
As will be explained later, this is very important to promote
competition.
1.2 Relevant Work
There has been a lot of research done in the field of multi-
unit auctioning which is applicable to spectrum auctions.
Some early pioneering work in this field was done by Mil-
grom and Weber. [12] Milgrom has another two impact pa-
pers in 1989 [15] and 2000 [11] respectively. Both of these
deal with the various intricacies of simultaneous ascending
auctions. However the spectrum auctions were first used
on large scale in FCC auctions at US. The results of these
auction provided valuable insights into spectrum auctions
and the various strategies employed by the bidders. This
is captured by various economists like Milgrom, Cramton,
Ausubel, McAfee, McMillan to name a few. All the corre-
sponding research can be found in many publications over
the past two decades. [3, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 19, 20] is only
a representative list of these publications. All these pub-
lications are centered over the various issues involved in
FCC auctions which was primarily based on simultane-
ous ascending multiple round auctions. It also provided
an insight of the effect of different market factors on the
results of the spectrum auction and this forms the basis of
the framework of spectrum auctions modeled in this pa-
per. Clock-Proxy auctions introduced by Ausubel, Cram-
ton and Milgrom [1] is another recent development in this
area. General multi-item auctions have also been investi-
gated by researchers. [2, 4, 12, 14, 18]
As already mentioned, the auction used in majority of the
spectrum licensing till date has been simultaneous ascend-
ing auction. There are many shortcomings of these auc-
tions which were highlighted time and again. [7, 20, 14]
We introduce in this paper a combination of sequential and
simultaneous designs of auctions called as Hybrid auctions
which we believe should be more practically robust against
collusion than simultaneous auctions.
1.3 Our Contributions
Our major contributions in this paper are as follows:
• We have come up with a comprehensive framework
of spectrum licensing procedure, based on the recent
research and practical results in this field.
• We have introduced a new Hybrid auction mechanism
for spectrum licences which is shown to be more ro-
bust with respect to collusive bidding.
We will begin by first identifying the ideal targets that a
government must keep in mind while initiating the licens-
ing process, in section 2. In this section we will also argue
as to why licensing is a better option than selling the spec-
trum altogether. In section 3, we will investigate what are
the various challenges in front of a government while de-
signing the licenses. Then we will move to the basic issue
of assigning the licences in section 4. We will also show
as to why auctions are preferred over other methods. We
will address various issues involved in designing the auc-
tion along with a description of their theoretical and prac-
tical outcomes. Finally in section 5, we will introduce and
analyze the new Hybrid algorithm being proposed by us.
2 Targets of Spectrum Licensing
The first step towards the process of licensing should be to
identify is the aim of the government in licensing the spec-
trum. It should identify all the short term as well as long
term requirements which must be fulfilled by the licensing
process. Some of these targets should be:
• Simple and well guarded: The whole process of li-
censing should be kept very simple with no ambi-
guity involved in the guidelines/rules. The process
should be simple both from government’s perspective
(should be easy to conduct), and from the interested
player’s perspective (should be simple to understand
and participate). It should also be well guarded as far
as legal issues are concerned.
• Promote efficient use of the spectrum: The final allo-
cation of the spectrum should be in way that the play-
ers who have won a share of the spectrum are able
to maximize the utilization of the allocated spectrum.
This will ensure proper development of technology as
well as the community.
• Revenue: Although not the only important issue, it is
still one of the most important issues involved, more
so in a developing nation like India. The spectrum
should not be undervalued in any case. The possibil-
ities of use of spectrum are endless. Nobody would
have imagined ten years ago, the multiple ways wire-
less technologies are being used today. This has been
given as the main reason while spectrum auctions
have generated much more revenue in recent times
than about a decade back. Under no circumstances the
government should settle for less than its estimated
value. It is better to repeat the licensing process again
after some time than to license it at a lower price.
• Promote competition and diversity: As is the case
with any trade, the government should aim to avoid
monopoly of any player. Putting appropriate caps on
the amount of spectrum that can be owned by a single
company is one of the many ways to ensure this.
• Time taken by the process: The delay in assigning the
licences is itself a cost to the government. As it is In-
dia is not one of the early birds as far as 3G licensing
is concerned, therefore the whole process should be
swift. To give a flavor of the time duration involved,
there have been spectrum auctions in US which went
on for more than 6 months. The time taken by the pro-
cess should not be so large that the companies get in-
volved in collusive strategies with either each other or
with the auctioneer; at the same time too short on time
should not hamper the revenue from the process. The
latter case happened during the Wireless Communica-
tions Services(WCS) auction at the US in 1997, when
the US congress’s decision to speed up the process in
order to receive revenues for current fiscal lead to a
hasty decision and thus poor revenue from the licens-
ing. [20]
• Social and Economic Growth: Proper support and en-
couragement should also be given to small businesses,
women/minority owned firms and to some extent new
entrants in order to promote more competition as well
as ensuring economic development.
• Transparency: The entire process of licensing should
be transparent to all the interested parties involved.
This reduces the possibility of corruption and at the
same time increases the trust of the interested par-
ties in the government and thus possibly resulting in
higher valuation of the spectrum by them.
3 Designing the Licence
Designing efficient licences is a key to success in spectrum
licensing. The proof of design having a pronounced effect
on the success of a particular auction design: having five
licenses in the UK UMTS auction, rather than four, was
critical in stimulating competition and thus extremely high
revenues [20]. This was due to the fact that there were 4
incumbents who were favorites to win the auction. The
increment of one licence leads to the possibility of a new
entrant, while in turn lead to fierce competition. Designing
spectrum licences involves complex political, engineering,
and economic factors. The various issues and options that
a government can face while designing the licences are:
• Division of the spectrum (Bandwidth-wise): The most
important decision is as to how to divide the total
available spectrum into various parts. Each of this
will have a separate licence. The question is how
many parts and of what size. The first part is easier
to answer; for this, the government needs to identify
the number potential interested parties in a given ge-
ographical area, and then the number of licences in
that area should be a fraction of that. For the second
part, one option is to divide it in equal parts. This ap-
proach has its own merit in that it provides flexibility
to the bidders during the auctioning process (Will be
explained in a later section). But let us suppose we
divide the spectrum in a way that there is 1 small li-
cence (bandwidth wise) and rest all are medium sized
and identical. A small licence will be obviously of in-
terest to small/new businesses, thus ensuring the goal
of economic development. Also this decision can be
affected by other issues involved in designing the li-
cence, as discussed below.
• Division of the spectrum (Geographical): The options
available for this issue are whether to have a single set
of licences all over the country (as done in UK), or to
have different licences for different circles. The first
option is suitable for small countries while the lat-
ter suits for larger countries. Also anticipating more
competition in metros, it is advisable to have more
licences in densely populated region. While for the
backward/sparsely populated areas, is would be bet-
ter to have less licences in order to promote competi-
tion. In defining the geographic scope of licenses one
must consider the ability of the auction mechanism
and secondary markets to efficiently aggregate small
licenses into larger coverage areas versus the ability
of secondary markets to efficiently disaggregate large
licenses into smaller areas.
• Size: There are many alternatives to define the size
of a license. The reason why this is important is that
on the basis of size of a licence only, it is possible
to evaluate it both by interested parties as well as the
government. Typically size is defined as a combina-
tion of following parameters:
1. Bandwidth allotted in the licence
2. Population of the region where the licence is ap-
plicable
3. Area of the region where the licence is applica-
ble
4. Literacy rate of the people in the region
How these parameters are combined to define the size
depends on the government; how much emphasis they
are giving to each of these aspects. Generally the first
two points are taken into consideration. For example
in US spectrum auctions, size is typically measured in
MHz-pop: the bandwidth times the population of the
region where the licence is applicable.
• Duration: The duration of licences is also a major de-
cision to be taken while designing the licences. With
the rapid pace of advancement in communications,
there will be many uses of spectrum in future, which
might be difficult to visualize now. So a long term
licence might undervalue the licensing price of the
spectrum in later years. At the same time, it should
also be long enough so that the investor has the con-
fidence of recovering his investment. Based on the
spectrum auctions taken place in past, duration of
around 10 years should be optimal.
• Use of Spectrum: The licence should specifically
mention what are ways in which the holder can use
the licence, and more importantly what uses are not
allowed. There should be a monitoring body for the
same. This can be used as a guard against any future
use of spectrum which might provide unjust advan-
tage to the holder. Again, this emphasizes the require-
ment for a strong legal shield for the licence.
• Bandwidth Cap: Another important issue is of the
limit on the amount of bandwidth a particular party
is allowed to hold in a particular area. This helps in
restricting monopolistic trade practices. For example
in US auctions, there is a limit of 45 MHz on holdings
by a single firm in a particular area. This ensures that
there are at least 5 different firms in any given area,
even after all the secondary market deals. A variant
can be to limit the number of licences a particular firm
can hold in any area to 1. This was used in UK spec-
trum auctions, and was a driving factor behind its suc-
cess as it negates the collusive strategies between the
interested firms. But in the case, that the sale of a part
of bandwidth licence is allowed (explained in the next
point), this second option is not applicable.
• Resale of bandwidth: In a majority of the spectrum
auctions conducted till date, bandwidth cap permit-
ting, the resale of licence was allowed i.e. the firm
which won the licence was allowed to sell it in sec-
ondary market. This very much helps in stimulating
competition as now more players are interested in the
licence hoping to earn profit by selling it in secondary
market. But in a majority of auctions till date, it was
allowed only to sell the full licence, or to divide it geo-
graphically. Another option could be to allow the win-
ners to divide the spectrum into bandwidth bands and
then sell each band separately. The division should be
allowed only at the discrete points (say at multiples of
5 MHz) only. Along with the revenue issue, this will
also help in efficiency cause as now with greater flex-
ibility, we can hope that the secondary market will
itself remove the inefficiencies of the initial alloca-
tion. Again the process of resale should be legally
bounded in order to avoid any problems in reauction-
ing the spectrum once the licence term expires.
• Payment Rules: There are 2 payment options: win-
ner pays the whole amount upfront or he does it in
instalments. The second option was used in US auc-
tion with the hope that it will stimulate competition by
promoting weaker firms. But many of those licences
ran into legal tussles with the winner not paying all
the instalments.
• Coverage of Backward Areas: Private firms will al-
ways be interested in developed areas only, and the
state owned firm can not develop all the backward ar-
eas on its own. Therefore it is required that the private
firms are mandated through the licences that they have
to invest in backward area also. Some of the ways to
do this:
1. A certain percentage of the population, in the
regions in which a firm has the licence, must be
rural. This can be made mandatory for all firms
above a certain threshold size of the licence.
2. Firms can be mandated to spend a certain
amount (can be possibly a fraction of the cost
of the licence) towards the development of com-
munication technology in the region. This
should be used with caution as it might result
in lowering the revenue.
3. As mentioned earlier, special help can be given
to ”designated entries”; state owned/minority
owned firms to participate in the licensing pro-
cess. How to do this? We will answer this ques-
tion in our next section
4 Assigning the Licence
Now we will move on to the second and perhaps the more
widely researched part of licensing the spectrum i.e. the
process of assigning the spectrum. First we will investigate
what are the traditional ways to assign the licence, show-
ing that spectrum auctions should be the preferred way of
doing it. Then we will provide a summary on the issues
an auctioneer must decide before starting the auction. Fi-
nally, we will report about the various types of spectrum
auctions methods, citing the advantages and the disadvan-
tages of each method.
4.1 Methods of Assigning the Licence
4.1.1 Administrative Process
As the name suggests, an administrative process begins
with the parties which are interested in the spectrum mak-
ing a proposal for how they intend to use it and their valu-
ations for the spectrum. The government or the auctioneer,
after viewing all the proposals, decides whom to allocate
the spectrum. The decision is taken on the basis of all the
prospects of the proposal, and the policies of the govern-
ment. As evident, there are many problems with this pro-
cedure: they are very slow, leave scope of corruption and
most importantly are not transparent. Thus it is not advis-
able to go for this approach.
4.1.2 Lotteries
In a lottery, the government randomly selects licence win-
ners from the interested firms in a draw of lots. There might
be an initial screening process before the lots but the lottery
process is transparent to all. As can be easily guessed, the
problem with this approach is that a firm with lower valua-
tion for the spectrum might win the licence. Thus the allo-
cation turns out to be inefficient more often than not. Also
since it is a game of chance, the players have every incen-
tive to apply in large numbers to improve their chance of
winning. Thus we might end up with a single firm apply-
ing with say about 50 different proposals. Worse yet, there
might be many individuals or small firms or firms which
do not have any use of spectrum, applying for the spec-
trum hoping to gain huge profits by selling it in the sec-
ondary market. Thus we might end up getting huge num-
ber of proposals for each licence. This results in a waste of
resources in processing the applications/proposals. More-
over, the winners are not those best suited to provide a ser-
vice. It can take years for the licenses to be transferred via
private market transactions to those capable of building out
a service.
4.1.3 Auctions
The main advantage of an auction is the fact that it assigns
the spectrum to the firm which values it the most along
with preserving transparency in the process. Everyone can
see why a particular bidder won the auction. Scope of col-
lusion with the government officials is drastically reduced
although there are still some other concerns. The revenue
generated in the process is also usually high as there is a
direct competition between the firms in the auctioning pro-
cess. Those companies with the highest value for the spec-
trum likely are willing to bid higher than the others, and
hence tend to win the licenses. There are several issues,
which are addressed below that can potentially limit the
efficiency of spectrum auctions. The success of auctioning
very much depends on these decisions regarding the de-
sign of the auctions and subtle change in any of these can
have a huge impact on the final analysis. There are also
some downside of auctioning process. It only ensures that
the bidder with the highest private value wins, not the one
with the highest social value. Private and social values can
diverge in these auctions because the winners will be com-
peting in a marketplace. Suppose we have 2 licences in a
given geographical region and 2 firms A and B bidding for
these. Suppose that A already holds one of the licences and
that auctioning for the second licence is being organized
by the government. Now the social outcome will be that B
wins the second licence leading to more competition in the
area. But A will no doubt try to beat B in the auctioning
process itself in order to establish its monopoly in the area.
Thus the private valuation of a might be more than that of
B for the second licence. Also, dependence on revenue
is usually very high in the auctioning process, although
certain designated bidders can be helped by the govern-
ment. In spite of all the above drawbacks, the advantages
of auction process are proven in spectrum auctions across
the world. The advantages of the process easily outweighs
the drawbacks many of which can be removed by clever de-
signing of licences and rules. Thus we can safely assume
that the best way to assign the licences is through auction-
ing them. So henceforth, we will refer to the process of
assigning the licence as auctioning them and the interested
parties as the bidders.
4.2 Auctioning Issues
We will now iterate some of the fundamental issues that
must be decided while designing an auction. The point to
note here is that there is no rule as such which will guaran-
tee the success of the auction. All we can do is theoretically
say that what are the options available and how bidders are
expected to behave in each of these scenarios. In addition
we have the history of spectrum auctions, some successful,
some not so, that provide us with an insight into the process
and how the bidders try to manipulate the whole process.
Also the applicability of each of these vary from auction
to auction depending pretty much on the valuation of the
licences by the bidders depending upon a large number of
issues right from the actually design of licences to the so-
cial and economic conditions of the country. So here are
some of the basic decisions involved in designing the auc-
tion (note that some of these are specific to multiple round
auctions):
4.2.1 Open Multiple vs Single Sealed Bidding
The first issue in auction design is whether to use a single
shot bidding process or to have multiple rounds whereas
the bidders get a chance to improve upon their bids. Gov-
ernments generally choose sealed-bidding process over
second option for the simple reason that the process is very
simple fast and fuss free. On the other hand, from the bid-
ders prospective, multiple rounds are a better method as it
gives them an opportunity to aggressively bid for the spec-
trum. The reason for these choices is that the simultaneous
sealed-bid auction is more difficult to rig than an ascend-
ing auction. This is because a member of a conspiracy to
rig the bids can cheat on the conspiracy by submitting a
bid secretly; thus sealed bids encourage breakdown of car-
tels. On the other hand if some member of a cartel goes
for cheating in a open ascending bid auction where his bid
information is open, he can be immediately punished in the
following round by the other members of the cartel by im-
proving upon the bids on the items of that particular mem-
bers interest.
As stated above, the main point of difference between the
two processes is that there is much more information avail-
able to the bidders in ascending auctions. In an ascending
auction, bidders can respond to the behavior of others dur-
ing the course of the auction. Paul Milgrom and Robert
Weber [12], proved that this increase the average revenue
in the auction in a symmetric environment. The ascend-
ing auction reveals information about the bidders to the
bidders. Revealing information reduces the size of the in-
formation rents obtained by bidders, increasing prices on
average. This positive relationship between revenues and
information transmission during the auction has been la-
beled ”the linkage principle” by Milgrom[15].
Now consider the case where the bidders are asymmetric.
Suppose we have one strong bidder and several weak bid-
ders vying for a single licence. Now the strong bidder
knows that there is very less competitions against him and
if he bids his true valuation, he should win. So his primary
target now shifts to profit maximization. He will be search-
ing for minimum bid which should land him the licence.
On the other hand the weak bidders know that they are up
against a strong bidder. So their best chance of winning is
to report their true values. In a single shot sealed bid auc-
tion, there is a possibility that the winner is the one of the
weak bidders. This will in fact be an inefficient allocation
as the valuation of a strong player can be much higher and
he lost while trying to maximize his profits. (Generally a
strong player is one of the incumbents and incumbents usu-
ally have more valuation to spectrum than new entrants).
In an ascending auction, the strong bidder would revise
its bid upward to win, were it actually the high value bid-
der. Ascending auctions also removes the ”winners curse”
problem. Suppose the government has adopted sealed bid
auctioning process. Since the bidders have no information
at all about the evaluation of other bidders, it is possible
that the winning bid is significantly higher than the second
highest bid. Although it might result in better revenue for
the government, it will result in depression for the winning
firm as he will believe that he has paid much more than
the actual cost even if the bid was in fact ex ante optimal.
This might result in lesser investment by the winning firm
in development of the communication technologies for the
Spectrum. Thus it might not be a socially optimal way to
auction the spectrum. Although this problem can be solved
with the help of second price auctions (Vickey Auctions),
it can result in another problem of revenue reduction. This
has already happened in some countries where the winning
bidder has to pay an amount just over the reserve price.
In an ascending auction, actual competition, rather than
an expectation about competition, forces bids to the level
achieved, reducing regret. On the other hand this might
lead to lesser revenue for the auctioneer although the his-
tory suggests otherwise.
Sometimes, with the new information revealed during the
course of the auctions, the valuations of the bidders may
also increase. For example a bidder with a fix budget bid-
ding for two licences might be ready to put more money
on second licence when he knows that he might be win-
ning the first below his valuation. Also the firms who are
ignorant about certain facts might discover them during
the course of the auctioning to revive their valuations and
hence their bids. While the weight of the economic litera-
ture favors multiple round ascending auctions, the case is
far from transparent, primarily because of the history of
government auctions using sealed-bids.
4.2.2 Simultaneous vs Sequential
The second most important auction design decision is
applicable whenever we have multiple inter related objects
to be auctioned, prime example being the spectrum
auctions. The traditional approach adopted not only by the
governments but also by various auction houses across the
world (for example Christie’s and Sotheby’s) is sequential
in nature. i.e. at a time bids are accepted only for a single
item. There can be multiple rounds as we have in open
verbal auctions, but the objects are auctioned in a fixed
predetermined order. On the other hand, in a simultaneous
auctioning mechanism, the auctioneer takes bids for all
the objects simultaneously in each round, spanning over a
variable number of rounds determined dynamically during
the auctioning process. We will now study pros and cons
of each of these designs in detail.
Consider the example of sponsored search auctions.
Various search engines like Google, Yahoo etc run auc-
tions for determining which sponsored links to display
alongside the search results. There are fixed number of
slots for the sponsored links. Now consider the case of
two slot model, i.e. there are only two slots for sponsored
links in some engine. And there are three bidders (A, B,
C) bidding for those two slots. Now suppose bidder A’s
advertisement requires a large space such that it cannot be
fitted in a single slot. So bidder A would like to preferably
win both the slots so that he can display his full fledged
advertisement, otherwise he has to curtail it. On the other
hand, B and C are happy with any one of the slots. When
the amount a bidder is willing to pay for an item depends
on the other items it acquires, sequential auctions deny
the bidder crucial information. Suppose now in above
example, bidder A values either slot separately at Rs 100
but combined value for both the slots is Rs 300. This
bidder on the first slot would be willing to pay up to Rs
200, provided it expected the second slot to sell for no
more than Rs 100. On the other hand, having bought the
first item, the bidder A would now be willing to pay up
to Rs 200 for the second item, even though this creates a
loss of Rs 100 on the pair. This problem for the bidder is
known as the exposure problem: holding one item exposes
one to a loss created by the complementarities in values.
The bidder has to forecast the price of future items to
bid sensibly on the earlier items. This need to forecast
creates a dilemma for the bidder, whether to bid safely
and probably lose, or bid aggressively and wind up stuck
holding an incomplete aggregation. Only a combinatorial
design avoids the exposure problem, but ends up creating
other problems, as will be discussed later.
Sequential auctions are problematic when items are
substitutes as well as complements. Suppose in our above
example of sponsored search auctioning, both bidders B
and C have a valuation of Rs 150 on either one of the slots.
Now suppose bidder A takes the risk and buys the first slot
in auction at a price of Rs 151, hoping that he will get the
second slot for upto Rs 149. But during the second auction,
say bidder B wins with a bid of Rs 150. Thus bidder A
end up getting only 1 slot for Rs 151 against his valuation
of Rs 100. Thus the process is inefficient in the sense
that items are not allocated to the bidder who values them
the most. The optimal solution would have been to either
give both slots to A or to give one slot each to B and C.
Although the revenue generated in this case is more than
that in the optimal case, there have been incidences in the
past where sequential auctions have led to absurd revenues.
The Swiss wireless-local-loop auction conducted in
March 2000 illustrates the difficulties of sequential sale.
Three nationwide licenses were sold in a sequence of as-
cending auctions. The first two licenses were for a 28 MHz
block; the third was twice as big (56 MHz). Interestingly,
the first license sold for 121 million francs, the second for
134 million francs, and the third (the large license) sold for
55 million francs. Empirical auction data have shown such
inefficiency to be a problem. In particular Gandal (1997)
demonstrated that use of sequential auctions for cable
TV franchises in Israel affected revenues, and arguably
affected efficiency.
In the above example of sponsored search slots, the
items to be auctioned were assumed to be identical. In
case they differ, there arises another problem with the se-
quential design, that of ordering the auctions for different
items. For example in the scenario of spectrum auctions in
India, suppose we have licences for each state separately.
Now the problem is to determine the order in which to
auction these licences; whether to go from north to south,
east to west, smallest to largest etc. Ordering induces a
bias; particular firms care more about some markets than
others and will prefer learning from the markets they care
less about first. In addition, sorting out the most important
markets prior to less important complementary markets is
advantageous. No ordering is neutral and thus there can
be possible spat among the auctioneer and the bidder on
the ordering of items. Again it opens up the possibility
of collusion of bidders with the government official to
auction in an order of their choice.
Another serious problem of sequential designs is that
it leads to the bidders following a pre specified set of
strategies. They are not able to incorporate the information
revealed during the auction process into their valuation.
This information is mostly regarding the valuations of
the other bidders, information about the licences already
being sold etc. This happens because of the pace of the
auction and the vast amount of money involved. The prime
example of this is the recent Indian Premier League’s
(IPL) player auctions. Teams came for auction with a pre
determined set of strategies and the auction ended with
highly skilled players getting lesser price than some of not
so good players who were auctioned in the later part of the
auctioning process. Adoption of pre determined strategies
was accepted by teams after the auctioning process. Thus
it hampers the basic advantage of having multiple rounds:
the information released during the auction process which
is expected to increase the valuations of the bidders
because it leaves bidders with large decisions in a very
limited amount of time.
On the other hand, the simultaneous auctions are rela-
tively new entry in the field of auctions. In a simultaneous
design, the auctioneer takes the bids for all items simul-
taneously from the bidders in each round. The auction
continues till there is no new bid on any of the items in a
round, i.e. the bidding on all the items start and stop simul-
taneously. The straightforward benefit of this design is that
it gives greater flexibility to the bidders who are interested
in clubbing the objects i.e. who want to pay more for a
particular combination of items. In our previous example
of sponsored search auctions, if bidding for both the slots
is done simultaneously, player A will come to know during
the bidding process about the valuations of bidders B and
C for the slots. Since bidding is simultaneous, there is
no need for bidder A to take the risk. Although it seems
that this might lead to a reduction in revenue (Rs 300
against Rs 301), it leads to an efficient allocation of the
spectrum because of the flexibility given to the bidders
to aggregate the items. Also in case of simultaneous
design, the amount of information revealed during the
auction is much more than that in case of sequential design.
The advantages of simultaneous design over sequential
are: firstly now auctioneer don’t need to worry about
the order of auctioning the items, as all the items are
auctioned simultaneously. Secondly, there is no time
bound i.e. simultaneous auctions run over several days,
so the bidders get enough time to evaluate the information
revealed during the auctioning process. This would help
them to deviate from pre defined strategies.
But the simultaneous design is also not without prob-
lems. The problem of collusion was explained above.
Along with this another major problem which comes up is
that now bidders go for wait and see strategy i.e. they wait
for other bidders to bid and then decide upon their own
bid. This is in fact the optimal strategy for each bidder. If
all the bidders start following this strategy, there will be
no bidding at all.
The solution was proposed by Paul Milgrom and
Robert Wilson is the activity rule: Each bidder must
be active in every round on a specified fraction of the
licenses they hope to win. By active it means that he
must have either the highest standing bid, or makes a
new bid on a particular item. Thus, a bidder that seeks
12 licences would, under a 50% activity rule, be required
to be active on at least six licenses. This puts a pressure
on the bidders to actively participate in the auctioning
process, and at the same time allow them with greater
flexibility to substitute to other licences if the one they are
bidding on becomes expensive. There are several options
also available for the activity rule. In the above mentioned
design, the licences are considered to be symmetric i.e.
each licence will contribute a single unit towards the
activity rule calculation. However it is possible, and is
being used in spectrum auction across the world, to have
non uniform weights assigned to licences on the basis
of size (as calculated from one of the methods described
above in licence design), importance, geographical area
etc. Another issue is that of the magnitude of the activity
rule. Low activity rule allows bidders to substitute more
aggressively. However the substitution by the bidders
starts decreasing as the prices of the items go up. So to
stop them from adopting wait and see strategy in final
rounds of bidding, it is necessary to increase the activity
rule. For example in the initial US spectrum auctions,
auctioneer used a three phase system: initially a 33%
activity requirement, then a 67% requirement, followed by
a 100% requirement.
Although economists have developed the solution
for above mentioned problem, there are still some other
problems in simultaneous design for which no guaranteed
solution is available till date. The first among this, the col-
lusion among the bidders was explained above. Another
problem is that of Demand Reduction which affects both
revenue and efficiency of the allocation, and is more pro-
nounced in case where multiple units of similar items are
up for auctioning. Take the example of sponsored search
auction mentioned above. Suppose the auctioneer has put
both the slots for simultaneous auctions. And suppose that
now we have only 2 bidders A and B with valuations of
Rs 100 for either slot. If both the bidders keep bidding
for both the slots, in simultaneous auctions they will end
up with one slot each for Rs 100 each. However, suppose
each one of them bids for only 1 slot each, then they will
win 1 slot each at a price much less than Rs 100. Thus
they have incentive to reduce their respective demand. As
shown by Ausubel and Cramton (1996), in a multiunit
uniform price auctions, generally every equilibrium case
is inefficient. Bidders have an incentive to shade their bids
for multiple units, and the incentive to shade increases
with the quantity being demanded. Hence, large bidders
will shade more than small bidders. This differential
shading creates inefficiency. The small bidders will tend to
inefficiently win licenses that should be won by the large
bidders.
And lastly, although the revenues received by the gov-
ernments across the world using SMR auctions have gener-
ally exceeded the expectation, in the absence of any bench-
mark it is still not possible to evaluate the performance
of this auction revenue wise. There has been criticism
of SMR design over the revenue received and evidence of
presence of collusion among the bidders. There is no proof
that the revenue received is the highest possible.
4.2.3 Combinatorial bids
As mentioned in the earlier sections, in case of auctions of
interrelated items like that of spectrum licences, a bidder’s
value of a license may depend on what other licenses it
wins. For example consider the case of sponsored search
auction mentioned above. In case of bidder A, he is
interested in winning both the slots for advertisement as
his advertisement can not fit into a single slot. On the
other hand there is one more bidder who wants only a
single slot for his advertisement. The value the first bidder
places on both the slots combined is Rs 100 while the
bidder B has a valuation of Rs 150 for either one of the
slots. Now if packaging of bids are not allowed and it is a
sequential design auction, than for winning both the slots,
bidder A will have to bid for at least Rs 150 in both the
rounds. Thus he will end up paying Rs 300, which is Rs
100 more than his valuation. The only equilibrium of this
game is that bidder B wins a slot for Rs 150, the other
remains unsold. This is both inefficient, as well as less
revenue is generated. In case package bids are allowed
or simultaneous auctions are performed, bidder A will be
able to package the slots and win both of them for Rs 200
which is efficient and revenue maximizing. Note that now
the equilibrium of the auction will be bidder A winning
both the slots.
With a package bid, the bidder either gets the entire com-
bination or nothing. There is no possibility that the bidder
will end up winning just some of what it needs. This saves
the bidders from the exposure problem in which a bidder
might have to pay more than his valuation just because he
has already bought a part of the package he is interested
in. In the example above, suppose bidder B’s valuation for
either slots was Rs 100 instead of Rs 150. And suppose
bidder A wins the first slot. Then his requirement of
2 slots is exposed to the second bidder, and being his
direct competitor, there is incentive for him to continue
bidding to increase the price and thus increasing the loss
to bidder A. Thus insulation from this problem provides
more confidence to the bidders and they bid more aggres-
sively. But package bids leads to many other issues as well.
Package bids tend to favor large bidders seeking large
aggregations due to a variant of the free-rider problem,
called the threshold problem (Bykowsky, et al. 2000,
Milgrom 2000). Take the case of sponsored search auction
above. Now suppose there is a third bidder C with a val-
uation of Rs 100 for either slot (Valuation of A = Rs 200
for both slots combined, valuation of B = Rs 150 for either
slot). Now the efficient outcome will be both B and C
getting a slot each. But suppose in the simultaneous design
both start bidding at Rs 75. And bidder A bids Rs 180 for
the package. Now since valuations are private information,
there is incentive for both B and C to not increase their bids
and hope that the other one does it so that the combined
bid crosses the Rs 180 bid of bidder A. Thus A would
end up winning for Rs 180 which is an inefficient outcome.
Another problem with package bids is the complexity
of the problem. If all combinations are allowed, even
identifying the revenue maximizing assignment is an
intractable integer programming problem when there are
many bidders and licenses. The problem can be made
tractable by restricting the set of allowable combinations
(Rothkopf, et al. [22]). But doing so will again lead to
the problem of decision of which combinations to allow
and which not so that the auction is fair. Again as with the
case of order of auctions in sequential auctions, finding
fair combinations are not possible. Alternatively, a bid
mechanism can be used that puts the computational burden
on the bidders. In such system, bidders must propose bids
that in combination with other bids exceed the amount
bids for standing package bids (Banks, et al. [21]).
So the best way out is to allow for resale of licences and
hope that the secondary market will remove the inefficien-
cies in the allocation. Although the revenue received by
the government might still not be the maximum possible,
it will lead to efficient final allocation. Also allowing resale
might improve competition and thus revenue as argued in
the previous sections.
4.2.4 Reserve Price
The reserve price or the starting price of auction below
which licence would not be sold is another tricky issue for
the auctioneer to decide. Usually reserve prices are a trade
off between revenue and efficiency. If the reserve price is
too high the licence might not even get sold. On the other
hand keeping low reserve price might lead to less revenue.
The point to notice here is that over the past decade, the
importance of the spectrum licences has increased many
folds. It has become a vital source of revenue for govern-
ments over the world. So a compromise on revenue part
might not be the greatest idea. On the other hand even in
the scenario when due to high reserve price the licence re-
mains unsold with the government, it might be beneficial to
auction it again after some time rather than to compromise
on the revenue. A seller who fails to sell has the option of
selling in the future; thus the seller’s value may not be the
seller’s use value, but instead the value of a buyer not yet
present; if the seller expects to sell at a higher price in the
future, it may be efficient not to sell today. This may be the
case when new technologies are possible, technologies that
will be resisted by incumbents since the technologies will
harm existing services. Another threat due to low reserve
price is that of stock piling by the incumbent. Though it is
irrelevant in the case of present spectrum auctions in India,
it is worth mentioning that incumbents might have incen-
tive to but the licence not for use but rather than to stock
pile them in order to reduce the competition. A low reserve
price would certainly help them in this cause.
4.2.5 Increment Size
In case of multiple round auctions, another important issue
in auction design is: what is the minimum bid increment
size allowed between the rounds, over the highest bid of
previous round. For example suppose we have 2 bidders A
and B bidding for a single item with a reserve price of Rs
100. The private valuations of A and B for the item are Rs
150 and Rs 159 respectively. Now suppose the minimum
increment size is of Rs 1. Then the auction will continue
for 51 rounds with both bidders increasing their bid by Rs
1 in each round. Note that it is in fact the optimal strat-
egy of bidding. So while we will get the optimal revenue,
keeping minimum increment size small will lead to auc-
tion being too lengthy and wasting of resources. On the
other hand suppose minimum increment size if of Rs 100,
then both the bidders will bid only Rs 100 and the item
will be allocated according to the tie breaking rule. In this
case although the auction is swift, revenue is drastically
left. Although we have taken extreme case in this example,
it is still clear that keeping minimum increment size large
will lead to inefficient allocation. Now consider the case
when minimum bid increment size is Rs 10. Now after 5
rounds, both A and B will bid for Rs 150, and item will
again be allocated on the tie breaking rule. Although the
auction is swift and revenue loss is also not much, but there
is a loss of Rs 9. This highlights the fact that fixed mini-
mum increment size leads are not the optimal solution and
that they should be dynamically changed over the course
of the auction. Paul Milgrom came up with an insight that
halving the step size or increment approximately doubles
the time required to complete the auction. The loss in rev-
enue happens only when the bidder with the second highest
value wins because the bidder with the highest value is not
willing to pay second highest bid plus the increment. Thus
the loss is maximum equal to the increment size. Also the
minimum increment size is generally not a absolute value,
rather in percentage of previous highest bid. So coupled
with the example above, it is easy to see that the best way
out is to have high increments in the early rounds when
there are more bidders to achieve speed up and low in-
crements in later round to achieve efficiency. Effectively
the increment size for a given round should be dependent
on the activity (or the number of new bids received repre-
senting the number of interested bidders) for that particular
licence in the previous round.
4.2.6 Designated Entries (Preferred Bidders)
The designated entries are those bidders who are supported
by the government for social/political causes. These in-
clude state owned firms, businesses owned by minority
groups/women. In case of developing country like India,
the Indian frims could also be aided by the government by
keeping them in this category to provide them level play-
ing field against the foreign giants. There are two ways
to support the designated entries. The first one is the tra-
ditional and simple way in which certain part of the item,
in this case the spectrum is kep aside for the designated
entries at a suitable price. But another way of aiding the
designated entries, the use of bidder credits, has been de-
veloped and used successfully in many spectrum auctions
across the world. A bidder credit is similar to the idea of
handicapping in sports. Suppose a designated entity, be-
cause of lack of capital or expertise, has a 10% lower value
on average. Then the auction can level the competition by
providing a 10% bidder credit - that is, charging the des-
ignated bidder only 90% of their bid. Bidder credits are
better compared to the first options due to following rea-
sons:
• Bidder credits increase competition in the auction.
The designated entities become more effective bid-
ders, while the non-designated entities also have a
chance to fight for the licenses that would otherwise
be set-aside.
• Bidding credits set a price or value for promotion of
designated entities, thereby permitting resale at a cost
of refunding the bidder credit.
• The inefficiency and the revenue loss is now less as
the designated entries will get the licences only when
their valuations are comparable to market price.
• Revenues may increase over the levels that would
prevail without any bidder credits, because for small
value of bidder credit, the increase in competition out-
weighs the inefficient allocation. On the other hand,
revenue will fall as the bidder credit gets larger than
the disadvantage of the designated group, and desig-
nated groups win majority of the licences. The US
spectrum auctions used 25
• The first policy of keeping aside a part of spectrum
for designated entries leads to the creation of small
licences by the government to minimize the revenue
burden. Also the market players lobby hard to min-
imize the set aside licences so that their competition
is less. In case of bidder credits, larger meaningful
licences could be formed.
• Price preferences naturally apply to partial ownership
of the designated entries, by giving partial credit. The
only problem with bidder credit option is the determi-
nation of the size of bidder credit. The point to note
here is that bidder credits can be use as an effective
handle to differentiate between different designated
entries by giving them different amount of credits.
4.2.7 Stopping Criteria and public information
Another important decision in the auction design is when
to stop the auction process in the auctions consisting of
multiple rounds over time. The choice is simple in case of
sequential auctions when only a single item is auctioned at
a time. So if there is no bid in any round the item is allot-
ted to the highest bidder of the previous round. In case of
simultaneous auctions, the general trend has been to stop
the auction process after a round in which there has been
no new bid on any of the items in the fray. But by vary-
ing the stopping criteria and slightly changing the design
of the auctions, we can overcome the drawbacks of the si-
multaneous auction while maintaining its strengths. This
will be explained in the next section in the hybrid auctions
being proposed by us. Also important is the amount of in-
formation to be made public by the auctioneer after each
round. In earlier auctions, all the information about the
bids including the bidder identity was made public after
each round hoping to provide more flexibility to the bid-
ders. But then there were several collusion cases among
the bidders. So now-a-days, only the bid amounts are made
public and the identity of the bidders is now exposed by the
governments.
4.3 Existing Auction Mechanisms
We will now describe different auction formats that have
been used for spectrum allocation, and discuss the pros and
cons of each (See also Agorics, 1996). The last in this list,
the Hybrid Ascending Multiple Round (HAMR) auction,
is what we are proposing as an alternative to the existing
SMR auctions which are being used in quite a few spec-
trum auctions across the world.
4.3.1 First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
This is the traditional method of allocating licences in In-
dia. Usually done with the help of tenders, this process in-
volves inviting sealed bids from all the interested bidders,
and then allocates the licence to the highest bid. Some-
times revenue is not taken as the only criteria but we will
not go into those political/social details. The auction is sin-
gle round, once and for all category auction.
There are three main advantages of the first-price sealed-
bid auction:
1. It is simple and easy to conduct.
2. The process of auctioning is fast, which is one of the
major advantages in the present case of India.
3. There is no scope of collusion among the bidders as
each bidder has to submit sealed closed bids to be
opened only after all the bids are submitted. So cartels
would break down.
In spite of above advantages and the fact that this has been
the preferred choice of auction mechanism over the years,
first price sealed bid auction have been long disposed in
favor of other mechanisms due to the following reasons:
1. The auction is not truthful i.e. it is not incentive com-
patible for the bidder to reveal his true valuation of the
licence as his bid. Winning bidder can improve his
profit if he bids than his valuation but higher than the
bids of all others. Since valuations are private knowl-
edge to all bidders and bids are known only after all
the bids are collected, each bidder relies on specu-
lation/past experience to speculate about the bids of
other players and then might shade or lower his bid
accordingly.
2. Since bidders tend to shade their bids, there is a strong
possibility that the bidder who wins the licence might
not be the one who values it the most i.e. the final
allocation is not efficient.
3. First price sealed bid auctions also suffer from the
winners curse problem, which was described above
in the auction design issues section. In some cases,
the winner might actually go bankrupt (for example,
NextWave Communications in the U.S.) by borrow-
ing a lot to bid high, but by not being able to service
this debt in the loan period through revenue genera-
tion. This is a socially unacceptable scenario.
Note that the first-price sealed-bid auction is similar to
what is called a ”Dutch auction”. In a Dutch auction, used
to sell tulips, the auctioneer starts with a given (usually
high) price for the resource and then progressively lowers
its asking price. The person who cries out the first bid for a
resource gets it; the one with the highest or first price gets
the resource being auctioned.
4.3.2 Sealed-Bid Vickrey Auctions
The famous Vickery second price sealed bid auctions were
invented by William Vickrey in 1961. Vickery auctions
are truthful i.e. it is dominating strategy for each bidder
to report his true valuations as his bid. Sealed-bid Vickrey
auctions are very similar to the first price sealed bid auc-
tion with the only difference being that now the winner has
to pay an amount equal to the second highest bid. Thus
changing only the payment rule, results in the auction be-
coming truthful in nature. Like the first-price auction, the
bids are sealed, and each bidder is ignorant of other bids
unless there is collusion. The item is awarded to highest
bidder at a price equal to the second-highest bid (or high-
est unsuccessful bid). In other words, a winner pays less
than the highest bid. If, for example, bidder A bids Rs 10
and B bids Rs 15 and C offers Rs 20, bidder C would win,
however he would only pay the price of the second-highest
bid, namely Rs 15.
The advantages of this auction design over the first price
auctions are:
1. Vickrey auctions are both economically efficient and
truth revealing. It is easy to show that, because the
winning bidder needs only pay the second highest bid,
there is no incentive to ”cheat” and misrepresent the
true value of the resource, and thus the item is won by
the bidder who actually values it the most.
2. Vickery auctions don not suffer from the winners
curse problem, as the winner has to pay an amount
equal to the second highest bid.
3. There is no dip in the revenue. Note that although bid-
ders bid their true valuations, the winner pays amount
equal to the second highest bid. Thus one might ex-
pect that there is a dip in revenue when compared to
the first price sealed bid auction. Nobel Prize win-
ning economist Roger Myerson Proved in 1981 the
famous revenue equivalence theorem which basically
proves that the expected revenue under both a sealed-
bid first-price auction and a Vickrey auction (sealed-
bid or English) are the same.
Apart from these reasons, Vickery auctions are better
when compared to multiple round auctions for the same
reasons the first price auction was. The main advantage
of both of the above designs over the open bid-multiple
round designs is the fact that they are much more resistant
to collusion by the bidders. It is also very difficult to rig
the process of auctioning, apart from lobbying for the
sequence in which the licences are to be auctioned.
The downside of the Vickery auctions is that in spite
of the revenue equivalancec theorem, in practice, it might
happen that revenue generated is not of the liking of the
government. The second bid might be ridiculously lower
than the first bid, as happened in case of spectrum auction
in New Zealand where the winning bid was much higher
but the second highest bid was just above the reserve price.
So the licence was sold just above the reserve price.
The general problem which exists in both the above auc-
tions is that the bidders might not even know their own
maximum valuations of the licence, i.e. after having a
flavour of other bidders’ valuations; they might be will-
ing to improve their bids in light of new information. This
is specific to Spectrum Auctions in the sense that first it
is a new and developing technology market, so it’s very
difficult to predict the utility of the licence by the bidder.
The problem is similar to the one faced by the auctioneer
while deciding upon the expected price or base price. Sec-
ondly, all the licences are inter-related. Since the bidders
might be interested more in packages (as explained earlier
in combinatorial bids) of licences rather than each individ-
ual licence, they might not be able to evaluate each one op-
timally, separately, and their valuation might be substan-
tially greater with the new information than without any
prior information.
4.3.3 Simultaneous/Sequential Ascending Multiple
Round Auctions
The solution to above problems led to the use of sequential
ascending multiple round auctions. This is precisely the
way individual items are auctioned by the auction houses.
The player’s auction, in the recently concluded Indian
Premiere League, is another example. Sequential auctions
are conducted for each item separately. Each auction
starts with a base price and then in each round, auctioneer
calls for new bids from the bidders in accordance with the
increment rule. The rounds continue till there is no new
bid by any bidder. The item is then allocated to the bidder
with the current highest bid.
In the simultaneous design, the bids for all the items,
in this case the licences are called simultaneously from all
the bidders. The auction can continue for many days as
now bidders do have the option to try and form favorable
packages. The rounds stop when there is no new bid
for any of the items. Thus the process starts and stops
for all the items simultaneously. Other aspects of these
auctions were discussed in details while explaining the
auction design issues above and it was also argued why
the simultaneous design is better than the sequential. In
fact, simultaneous design has been the choice for various
governments for quite some time now. Here we will
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of simultaneous
ascending multiple round auctions.
The advantages of Simultaneous Ascending Multiple
Round (SAMR) auctions, over the previous two auctions
discussed above are:
1. Having multiple rounds of auctions results in efficient
allocation.
2. There is no winners curse as the winner has to pay
second highest bid plus an increment.
3. Much more information available to bidders during
auctions which might act as a favorable catalyst for
revenue generated.
4. Bidders tend to re-evaluate their bids over the course
of auction, and the long duration of auction provides
them ample time to take the new information revealed
during the previous rounds into account and make ma-
jor decision over their future bids.
However, SAMR does have some drawbacks also. These
have already been discussed in various sections above, but
to summarize we have the following disadvantages:
1. The whole method is complex.
2. The process can be too lengthy when compared to sin-
gle round auctions.
3. Although the revenue generated by using SAMR
auctions has usually exceeded expectations, there is
no theoretical proof that SAMR auction are revenue
maximization auctions.
4. Collusion among the bidders has been a major prob-
lem for SAMR spectrum auctions across the world.
5. Demand reduction also becomes a problem in case a
firm is allowed to have more than 1 licence in a par-
ticular geographical region.
Thus the SAMR auction also has not been the perfect auc-
tion design. Many other, even more complex, designs have
been proposed by various economists (for example Clock-
Proxy auction by Cramton et.al.) but we will not explore
those here.
5 Hybrid Ascending Multiple Round
Auction
For sake of simplicity we will call drop ”ascending mul-
tiple round” from all the three (sequential, simultaneous
and hybrid) auction mechanisms. We have seen the logic
behind using multiple rounds for spectrum auctions. But
both simultaneous and sequential multiple round auctions
have their pros and cons. The biggest advantage of
using a sequential design is that it virtually removes the
possibility of collusion despite using open bids. There
has been a lot of evidence in spectrum auctioning history
where using Simultaneous auctions have led to collusion
among the bidders and hence significantly lowering of the
revenue. On the other hand numerous disadvantages of the
sequential design were also listed above.
We propose Hybrid multiple round ascending auction,
a novel auctioning mechanism which combines the plus
points of both the above designs. In addition to changing
the order of rounds, it also has unique stopping criteria in
form of saturation factor. This is done in order to speed
up the process and also to stop it from degenerating into
simultaneous auction. We will first explain the design and
then argue about its usefulness.
5.1 Design
Consider for example the scenario in which we have 3
licences A,B and C for sale. Then, the sequential auction
will have first all the bidding rounds of A (assuming that
the order is A,B,C), followed by the bidding round of B,
and finally those of C. In case of simultaneous, in each
round bidders will simultaneous bid on all the 4 licences
till there is no further new bid on any of those. In our
proposed hybrid design, in each round of bidding, bidders
will sequentially bid on the licences. For example in above
case, bidders will first bid for A (single round), then for B,
then C and then D. In the next cycle, again each of these
licences will have one more round of bidding sequentially.
The difference is illustrated in the picture below.
The basic goal which we are trying to achieve here
is to make available more information to the bidders
than in sequential, and at the same time ending bidding
of different items at different ties. This will effectively
reduce the possibility of collusive bidding. Recall that in
simultaneous auctions, the bidding was over when there
was no new bid on any item in any particular round. Note
that if we use the same stopping criteria in the hybrid
auction, that we used in simultaneous, then hybrid will
also degenerate into simultaneous in the final analysis.
saturation factor: To overcome the above issue, in our
design we propose the use of a saturation factor (SF)
for each of the licences which will control the stopping
of bidding for that particular licence. This is a kind of
reverse activity rule that is activity rule on items rather
than on bidders. SF also helps in avoiding collusion as
will be explained later. The SF is initially set to 0 for
every licence. In every round when there is no new bid
on licence i, SFi is increased by 1. Bidding on licence
i stops when SFi reaches a ’threshold saturation factor’
TSFi. This threshold can be used as a controlling factor
by the government to speed up the whole process. Lower
threshold will mean that the auctioning on that particular
item will end briskly. On the other hand, government
might want to set a higher threshold for important/lucrative
licences in order to provide bidders with more time to
process the information gained during the auctioning
process, hoping that it would ultimately result in higher
revenues. We can easily arrive at the following result:
Claim 1: Collusive bidding can not be an equilibrium
strategy for the bidders.
Proof : The proof is based on the observation that although
bidding for all the licences goes on simultaneously,
bidding for no two items can end simultaneously. Suppose
2 bidders, X and Y, decide to collude upon 2 licences, say
A and C in above example, with X getting A and Y getting
C. Also lets us assume without the loss of generality that
the order of bidding is the same as in above that is bids for
A are taken before those for C. Suppose that the threshold
for both the licences is same (TSFA = TSFC), and till
the round when the saturation factor for both A and C is
just 1 less than the TSF , both X and Y are colluding not
to increase the bids. Then in this case, in the next round if
Y does not increase the bid on A (abiding the collusion),
then it has the danger of X increasing the bid on C. This
is possible because by that time, X would have already
won the licence A. Thus the best strategy for X would be
to break the cartel and increase the bid on C as Y is his
competitor in the market. Thus Hybrid helps in avoiding
the collusion just like the way sequential design does.
Hybrid reveals much more information about the valua-
tion of the licences by the different bidders than the sequen-
tial. But due to its design, it also suffers from some of the
drawbacks of the sequential auctions. The major among
the is the ordering of licences for auctioning. This can be
avoided by randomly selecting orders in each rounds. This
could not have been done in sequential auction. Another
point which should be mentioned here is that the saturation
factor (SF) also helps in bounding the time required for
the auctioning process. Normally the simultaneous auction
when used in different spectrum auctions ran into many
months. Sequential bidding in each round might result in
even more elongated process. But by using saturation fac-
tor, we should be in fact able to speed up the whole process.
Its use is analogous to the use of activity rule for bidders,
which prompts them to bid on more and more licences. By
saturation factor we will be able to pull bidders to licences
as when SF on any item reaches near its TSF, bidders will
know that bidding on that licence is about to end and it’s
now or never for them. Of course, the TSF and current SF
will be common knowledge to all the bidders.
6 Future Directions
There are several research directions possible in this area:
• Till date, there is no model to measure the revenue
efficiency of multiple round auctions. It will be an
interesting direction to come up with such a model
and then to evaluate various different multiple round
auctions explained above, on that model.
• One can investigate the effect of ordering of items on
the total revenue generated both in case of simultane-
ous and sequential auctions.
• A mathematical model to characterize various mar-
ket factors and their effect on the spectrum licensing
procedure would be the ultimate target for complete
understanding of the process. It can easily be a highly
complex model so it will require a lot of market in-
vestigation and research
In this paper, we have tried to come up with a comprehen-
sive framework for spectrum auctions based on current lit-
erature. We expect this to act as a guide for future spectrum
licensing procedures especially for those countries which
are new in this field. We also introduced Hybrid auction
which we believe should be a practical replacement for the
existing simultaneous multiple round auctions.
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